Voting is an essential element of mechanism design for multiagent systems, and decision support for CSCW tools implementing online deliberative assemblies. Much attention has been given both to designing the process so that it is resistant to manipulation by strategic voting, and so that an automated system can follow rules of order as developed for the conduct of formal meetings. In this paper, we formalise a general voting protocol trying to take into account a right to cast a vote, and an entitlement that the vote cast is counted in the correct way. We discuss the design and development of a system for online deliberative assemblies, that incorporates this protocol as part of a suite of protocols which collectively implement rules of order. We conclude with some comments on the voting protocol as it relates to the 2004 ACM Statement on E-Voting.
INTRODUCTION
Voting is the sine qua non of computer-based electronic voting (e-Voting) systems for public elections, an essential element of mechanism design for multi-agent systems, and a crucial aspect of decision making in CSCW tools implementing online deliberative assemblies.
Despite the evident potential advantages of voting for coordination (in multi-agent systems), democratic public elections, and e-Government, a number of risks remain. Some of these are endemic to the nature of voting itself: for example, Arrow's Theorem [2] , which states that there is no 'ideal' election method, indicates that all methods of winner determination can be manipulated by strategic voting. Other risks pertain to the fact that these are computer-based systems, and may have been poorly designed, inadequately tested, and left security holes which can be exploited. Yet other risks arise from the fact that in distributed systems of 'autonomous' components there is a possibility that, during the process of taking a vote, a component may, for whatever reason, misbehave (its actions deviate from the 'ideal').
Therefore, we require an electronic voting system to be robust. However, even leaving aside basic security considerations (such as encryption, secure message transport protocols, etc.), which are addressed by commercial applications (e.g. [9] ), robustness has several different aspects. One aspect of robustness is that the voting system achieves the 'optimal' outcome, i.e. the outcome reflects the 'popular vote' and is resistant to manipulation by strategic voting. A second aspect of robustness is flexibility. Rules in human organization have 'degrees of freedom' in terms of being broken, and automated systems should support this freedom, not compel users to comply. A third aspect of robustness is found in ensuring that whoever counts the votes and declares the results does so in accordance with the way that the votes are cast and the rules which decide who has won. Voting, like auctions, is commonplace in multi-agent systems and much attention has been given to this particular aspect of mechanism design (the process of designing a choice mechanism that translates expressed preferences into a decision). In particular, designing the process so that it is resistant to manipulation by strategic voting has been studied, with many results (e.g. [7] ). This work has contributed to achieving robustness with respect to the optimal outcome. In addition, there has been significant work in designing a decision-support system (called ZENO) for online deliberative assemblies [16, 15 ] using Robert's Rules of Order, the standard handbook for conducting business in deliberative assemblies [17] . In particular, a design maxim for the ZENO system could have been "anything goes unless someone objects", so this work has, inter alia, contributed to achieving robustness with respect to flexibility. This paper is concerned with the third aspect of robustness: namely the requirement for robustness to respect the way in which votes are cast and the outcome is declared. This is especially important in light of the 2004 ACM Statement on E-Voting [1] , which includes the stipulation that:
[computer-based electronic] voting systems should enable each voter . . . to verify that his or her vote has been accurately cast and to serve as an independent check on the result produced and stored by the system.
To address this issue, we analyse a voting protocol for an online deliberative assembly (although the analysis is generic and applies equally to virtual organizations, ad hoc networks, and e-Voting systems). We consider an online deliberative assembly as an open agent society, and model this society in terms of powers, permissions, obligations, and sanctions [4, 6] . In particular, we characterise a notion of enfranchisement with respect to a right (to vote), and an entitlement (to a 'fair' result). We then formally specify a general voting protocol using the Event Calculus [12] .
Accordingly, the rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 informally introduces the voting protocol, and Section 3 characterises a notion of enfranchisement. Section 4 specifies the protocol in terms of powers, permissions, obligations, etc., and Section 5 considers the formal specification with respect to satisfying the requirements for this notion of enfranchisement. Section 6 briefly considers some additional issues, while Section 7 discusses the development of a system for online deliberative assemblies, in which the voting protocol is just one member of a suite of protocols which collectively implement rules of order. Section 8 concludes the paper, and in particular we comment on this work with respect to the ACM Statement on E-Voting.
VOTING PROTOCOL
This section gives a brief, informal specification of a voting procedure, based on Robert's Rules of Order (Newly Revised) [17] , henceforth RONR, making clear any assumptions or alterations needed for a computational setting. We begin by defining the procedure for taking a vote, defining some subsets of the members (agents) of the network according to what we provisionally refer to as their roles, specify the actions that may be performed in the voting protocol, and then discuss how actions affect the status of motions, where motions are the statement on which the vote is being taken.
Procedure
According to RONR, an appropriate procedure for conducting a vote in a committee meeting is as follows:
• the committee sits and the chair opens the meeting;
• a member proposes a motion; • another member seconds the motion;
• the members debate the motion;
• the chair calls for those in favour to cast their vote;
• the chair calls for those against the motion to cast their vote; • the motion is carried, or not, according to the standing rules of the committe.
In the context of a deliberative assembly, we will associate a committee with the assembly itself, and the committee members with the assembly members. A meeting of the members at which decisions are to be made will be termed as a session: there may be several sessions during the lifetime of an assembly. As the system is online, the access point is through an agent and the term agent will be used for 'member' in the subsequent analysis.
Roles
This informal description gives the basic steps in the voting procedure. To determine who is empowered (in a sense that is made explicit later) to enact (or perform) each step, we identify a number of subsets of the set of agents. How set membership is determined we do not address precisely here; although we note it can be done in a variety of ways. For example, it could be done by default (being a representative in the assembly automatically classifies into one or other set); by qualification (being in possession of some certificate or capability ensures classification), or by assignment (i.e. some other protocol is used to allocate members to a set).
The subsets of the set of agents according to the roles that the agents can occupy, are:
voter, i.e. those agents who are enfranchised (have the right to vote); proposer, those agents who are empowered to propose motions; seconder, those agents who are empowered to second motions; chair, those agents who are qualified to conduct the procedure; one of whom, at any time, will be designated to be the actual chair, and thereby empowered to conduct the procedure; monitor, those members who are to be informed of the actions of others, in particular the votes and the results of votes.
We assume a predicate qualifies which holds of an agent belonging to the set. We then assume (and will not address further here) a role assignment protocol which determines, for those agents that qualify, which role(s) they occupy. This determines who occupies the roles of voter, proposer, chair and monitor. It is, however, the act of proposing that determines the set of seconders (i.e., of those agents qualified to act as seconders, which of them occupy the role of seconder, whereby they are empowered to second motions).
Actions
The set of possible actions that may be performed by agents can be identified from the informal description of the protocol and are listed in Table 1 . For the committee to sit there have to be actions to open and close a session; we need actions to propose and second motions; we need actions to open and close a ballot on a motion; and above all we need actions to vote for/against a motion (or abstain), and to declare a motion carried or not. It should be intuitive from the identified roles and an informal understanding of the actions that only agents occupying certain roles may meaningfully perform certain actions. This has significance for establishing the status of motions, which are institutional facts in the domain (cf. [18, 11] ).
Motions
The status of a motion follows a nearly linear sequence as indicated by the actions in Table 1 . Initially, the status of all (putative) motions is null. After an agent proposes a motion its status is proposed; after it is seconded, seconded; after it has been discussed and the chair opens a ballot on the motion it is voting; after a certain time, during which votes are cast for or against the motion, when the chair closes the ballot its status is voted; after the votes are counted, and the motion is declared either carried or not carried, according to the standing rules of the committee. Note that the standing rules can be anything 'reasonable' (majority of members, majority of those voting, etc.), but the rules themselves will have been negotiated during the formation of the committee. However, they can also be the subject of motions themselves (i.e. agents can propose to change the standing rules).
State Information
In addition to the status of a motion, we need to represent the following items of information: the votes cast for/against the motion, which way each voter voted on a motion, the roles of each agent, the normative positions of each agent, and any sanctions held against each agent. 
CHARACTERISATION
A crucial element of voting is being enfranchised: in other words, each agent who is a voter is enfranchised and has the right to vote. However, it appears that encapsulated in this right there is also an element of entitlement: in particular the voters are entitled to a 'fair' outcome which respects the way they have cast their votes and the agreed rules for determining the winner. This section is concerned with a characterisation of such a notion of enfranchisement for encoding in an electronic voting protocol.
To do this, we will use the informal analysis of the voting process of the previous section together with the formal apparatus of the Event Calculus (EC) to formally specify a notion of enfranchisement. First we give an informal characterisation of the requirements for enfranchisement, then (in the next section) we consider how these requirements can be encoded in a formal specification of the voting protocol. The formal specification will be given in the Event Calculus.
Enfranchisement
We characterise a notion of enfranchisement as composed of two elements:
• having the right to vote; and • having an entitlement associated with that right.
In this instance, having the right to vote is decomposed into three aspects:
• having the power (being empowered) to vote; • denying anyone else the power to object to 'appropriate' exercise of this power; and • subjecting inappropriate removal of this power to sanction;
while the associated entitlements are also decomposed into three aspects:
• being entitled to access the 'voting machinery';
• being entitled to have the vote counted correctly; and • being entitled to a 'fair' outcome (i.e. the result is declared according to the way the votes were cast with respect to the standing rules of the committee).
Thus enfranchisement is, in the context of this work, composed of two elements: a right and an entitlement. The right is characterised by the power to perform the action, and the fact that nobody is allowed to prevent the agent from acting in this way, either by objecting (see later) or by removing the power without repercussion. However, there also appears to be a second element of enfranchisement, that of entitlement. In our analysis, being enfranchised is (partially) analogous to being entitled to a resource: when that is the case, a request to access the resource must count as such, there is an obligation on the access controller to grant access to the resource, and the resource should be properly usable (cf. [3] ). From this perspective, having a vote should be like having (being granted) access to an abstract voting machine, which correctly records the vote, and produces the correct result (again, according to the rules). Therefore there appears to be three aspects to this entitlement. The first is being entitled to access the 'voting machinery': this is really concerned with the physical dimension of voting, and need not concern us further here. The second aspect of entitlement is implicit in the 2004 ACM Statement on E-Voting, and the requirement that "the vote has been accurately cast". The third aspect of entitlement is characterised by the fact that 'being entitled to' [something] means in part having the (institutional) power (i.e. performing the action counts as a valid action in the context) and a corresponding obligation on someone else (cf. [8] ).
It is these concepts that we seek to encapsulate in the formalization presented in the next section. First, though, we present the technical basis for this formal analysis.
Analytic Base
The Event Calculus (EC) is a formalism from Artificial Intelligence intended to reason about action and change in non-monotonic systems [12] . There are several variants of the calculus: the version used here is that used in [3] . An Event Calculus specification consists of a domain-independent part and an application specific part. The domain independent part includes axioms for determining what holds at a given time (or in a given state). What holds are fluents, which can be either true or false if the fluent is boolean, or some value from a specific range in the case of many-valued fluents. The application-specific part specifies axioms for determining: what holds at the initial time, the values of particular fluents that are said to be initiated by a specific action at any time, and the state constraints which determine what holds (or does not hold) at any time.
The normative 'building blocks' for our characterisation of enfranchisement (as right and and entitlement) are (institutional) powers, permissions, obligations and sanctions. In the study of legal and social systems, there is a standard, long-established distinction between power, physical capability, and permission [13] . Intuitively, physical capability is concerned with establishing physical facts (what Searle [18] referred to as 'brute' facts), power is concerned with establishing 'institutional' facts ( [18, 11] : these are facts that exist by convention and may have no physical reality). Permission (and obligation) qualify both power and physical capability. Agents can be permitted, or not, to perform actions which establish (see to it that) either brute facts or institutional facts are true or false.
Central to the issue of establishing institutional facts is the Jones and Sergot [11] formalisation of institutional power. This allows that in the context of a given institution, certain kinds of actions have a conventional significance, in that they count as (seeing to it that) particular kinds of facts (i.e. institutional facts) are true. Specifically, in a deliberative assembly (the institution), the action of raising one's right hand in the appropriate circumstances will count as a 'yes' vote (say), assuming the one raising the hand has the power to vote (for example the same person performing the same action in another context does not count as a vote; a different, unempowered person performing the same action in the same context also does not count as a vote).
FORMAL SPECIFICATION
In this section, we examine how the requirements of the right aspect and the entitlement aspect are encapsulated in an EC specification. We are not attempting here to present a formalization of these concepts in general, but only those aspects that are pertinent to electronic voting following certain rules of order. In the subsections below, we give the EC axioms which capture the relevant requirements. There are however many further axioms required to complete all aspects of the specification: space constraints preclude a comprehensive listing. We begin though with a formal specification of the fluents and actions used in the specification.
Actions
The actions in the protocol are listed in Table 1 . In addition to the actions identified in section 2.3, for completeness we introduce four extra actions, kill, which is a kind of 'housekeeping' action, and the object, sustain, and overrule actions, which are placeholders for an objection mechanism, as discussed later.
Fluents
The fluents represent the status of motions and the normative positions of the agents, as informally indicated in Section 2.4 and 2.5. They are summarised in Table 2 .
Powers
Agents that occupy particular roles are empowered to perform certain actions. Generally, agents only 'possess' these powers when particular fluents have a certain value, that value being the status of a motion or a session. In other words, status plus role determines power. All the powers are summarised by the following axioms.
pow(C, open session(C, S))
role of (C, chair ) = true holdsat T
Changing Motion Status
We have seen how when a motion has a particular status and an agent occupies a specific role, then the agent is empowered to perform an action. In many cases, the exercise of the power by performing the action is sufficient to change the status of a motion: this effectively 'switches off' the existing power and 'switches on' other powers. This section gives axioms for performing actions which, if performed by empowered agents, changes the status of a motion (and so changes powers). 
The axioms for the open session and close session actions

Casting & Counting Votes
The open ballot action at time T starts a ballot by changing the status of a motion to voting(T ), and also empowers those agents occupying the role of voters to cast votes either for or against the motion. These votes have to be recorded and counted. For this we use a fluent voted, which records for each agent how its vote was cast, and another fluent votes, which records the number of votes for/against the motion. When the chair opens the ballot (on M ), the fluent voted (V, M ) is initially nil for all agents V , (if the agent does not vote, it retains this value and the standing rules determine if this is counted as an abstention), and the value is updated when the voting agent exercises its power. Also when the chair opens the ballot, the fluent votes(M ) is initialised to (0, 0), and the appropriate value in the 2-tuple is updated according to the way the vote is cast. The following axioms specify the effects of these actions.
The axiom for abstaining (by V on M ) simply initiates the value of the voted (V, M ) fluent to abs.
Changing Votes
One feature of an election may be the idea of 'one man, one vote', i.e. each agent in the system only gets one vote. It is for this reason that if the fluent voted for some agent V did not have the value abs, then it meant that the agent had already cast its vote. Then, it no longer had the power to vote on this election, and any further vote actions it performed would not count as votes, so the fluent votes (for this M ) would not be updated.
However, it is also a feature of voting in RONR that voters are allowed to change their minds. If we wanted to accommodate this feature, we can introduce a revoke action. An agent occupying the role of voter would be empowered to revoke its vote (or its abstention) if, just as before, the motion status and role determined the power, but also if the value of the voted fluent was not nil. If it then exercised this power it would initiate two changes to the fluents. Firstly, the voted fluent would be 'reset' (to nil), and secondly, the votes fluent would need to be decremented according to how the original vote had been cast.
The axioms for specifying these features are straightforward.
Proxy Votes
We conclude this section with a brief remark that it is also possible to allow proxy votes if we have a procedure (which we do not specify here) for establishing the power to represent. However, this procedure requires no extra expressive power beyond that which we already have: a specification of representation relations can be given in terms of institutional power. Representation then enables one agent (the representative) to act in the name of another (the principal). In our case, we can then get one agent to vote on behalf of another. Such representation is an important feature of the system we are developing (see later), where presence 'at' the assembly may be transient.
MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we consider how the formal specification of the previous section, in conjunction with other normative positions relating to permission and obligation, meets the requirements characterising our notion of enfranchisement identified in Section 3.
We begin with the 'right' aspect of enfranchisement. Section 3 partially characterised the right to vote by the power to vote. We have already seen (Section 4.3 how an agent has the power to vote if it occupies the role of voter (so it has previously qualified for this role), if the motion has the appropriate status (i.e. the ballot has been opened), and in 'one man one vote' elections, the agent has not already voted (or has voted but has revoked the vote).
The second element of the characterisation was that no other agent was empowered to object to the valid exercise of the power. By 'valid exercise' of power, we really mean permission. So, for this, we simply include an axiom of the form 'power implies permission'. Note that there is no fixed relationship between power and permission: an agent may have the power but not the permission, and equally may have the permission to perform an action but not the power (so perfoming the action does not 'count as'). In our case, for this aspect of the right to vote, we include the axiom:
and stipulate that there can be no valid objection to a permitted action. The third aspect of the characterisation is an example of exercising power without permission. This was concerned with inappropriate removal of the power. There are in fact (at least) two ways of formulating the power to vote. One way is to always grant the power but only occasionally the permission. A second way, as used here, is to only occasionally grant the power but always give permission whenever the power is granted. However, this second way requires that there is some mechanism for 'switching on' and 'switching off' this power. We have already seen one: if an agent casts a vote, that removes its power (to vote again), although it can recover its power by revoking the vote. However, there is another one. This is when the chair agent closes the ballot: note that this too removes the power to vote because the action changes the status of the motion.
Therefore, for the action of closing the ballot, we do not want power to imply permission. It would certainly be undesirable if the chair could close a ballot at any time, especially as soon as its preferred result was in force, but not everyone had voted. On the other hand, for flexibility, we do not necessarily want to preclude the chair from closing a ballot ahead of time (for example, if a simple majority had already voted one way).
We can allow for both eventualities by specifying that the chair has the power to close a ballot, but does not have permission to exercise this power unless certain conditions are satisfied. Then, if the chair exercises its power without permission, the ballot will still be closed, but the chair agent will now be subject to a sanction (see the next section). For the sake of example, it could be that a certain minimum time should have elapsed since the opening of the ballot (say 10 time units). In addition, after a further time has elapsed (say 20 time units) the chair might even be obliged to close the ballot. Performing some actions when under obligation to perform another (e.g. closing a session while under obligation to close a ballot) can also be subject to a sanction. This example could be specified by the following two axioms.
per(C, close ballot (C, M )) = true holdsat T ←
role of (C, chair ) = true holdsat T ∧
status(M ) = voting(T ) holdsat T ∧ T > T + 10
obl(C, close ballot (C, M )) = true holdsat T ← role of (C, chair ) = true holdsat T ∧
status(M ) = voting(T ) holdsat T ∧ T > T + 20
The second element of enfranchisement was the element of entitlement. This in turn had three aspects. The first aspect was an entitlement to access the voting machinery: as we have already discussed, this is a physical condition and not our concern here. The second aspect was an entitlement to have the vote counted correctly. This is effectively captured by the votes and voted fluents as described above. (Of course, in implementation as opposed to specification, there is an obligation on whoever is responsible for operating the 'voting machine' to record these fluents correctly; but again this is outside the scope of our concerns here.) Finally, the third aspect was the entitlement to a 'fair' outcome.
In an analysis of an argumentation protocol [5] , between a proponent and an opponent, there was a determiner who declared the result at the end. The determiner was also obliged to declare the result for the proponent, if the opponent conceded, and vice versa.
The situation is much the same here. Therefore we can also formulate axioms which oblige the chair to declare the motion carried, if certain conditions have been satisfied, and equally, to declare the motion not carried if one or other of these conditions has not been satisfied. Note these 'certain conditions' are completely application dependent, and a codification of the standing rules of the committee. For example, typical conditions might be that the vote is quorate (however 'quorate' is defined by the standing rules), that there is a two-thirds majority in favour of those that have voted, and so on. Supposing that we wanted to simply implement majority voting, then the obligation on the chair would be expressed by the following axioms:
Notice that the obligation to declare the correct result also implicitly demands that the votes are counted according to the way they are cast.
Thus we see that certain agents are enfranchised (have the right, or are entitled to vote). This means that when a vote on a motion is called, these agents are empowered to vote.
Taking all the votes together, the motion is carried if all the conditions are satisfied, and not carried if one (or more) of the conditions are not satisfied. However, the chair is obliged to declare the result correctly with respect to these conditions (which are the codification of the standing rules of the committee). This obligation on the chair is the counterpoint to the power which constitutes the entitlement to a 'fair' outcome.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
In this section, we briefly look further at three residual issues. First, we reutrn to the issue of proposing and seconding; then we look further at the issue of sanctions, picking up on actions of the chair that were not permitted or contrary to obligation. Finally, we consider briefly the use of an objection mechanism, as another way of dealing with 'invalid' behaviour.
Proposing and Seconding
Previously, we alluded to the idea that the propose action (performed by an empowered agent) defined the set of seconders, i.e. the set of agents who qualified as seconders each occupy the role of seconder as a result. Occupying the role meant they were empowered to second a motion, which could then go forward for a vote.
However, a minor clause of RONR stipulates that if an agent proposes a motion, then the same agent cannot also be the seconder for that motion. The following axiom allows agents to occupy the role and also prevents both proposing and seconding a motion.
So in addition to changing the status of the motion to proposed , the propose action also empowers and determines the set of possible seconders (by initiating the role).
Note that the action second performed by any of the agents occupying this role will now switch the power off for all them (i.e. set the role of (B, seconder ) to false), and we also need an axiom for this.
Once a motion has been proposed and seconded by empowered agents, the chair will now have the power to open a ballot (derived from its role and the status of the motion). In this case, it will also have permission by virtue of the power (i.e. power implies permission in this case). However, we could specify that the chair has an obligation to open the ballot. Therefore there is some element of entitlement also in being a proposer or seconder, as well as being a voter: i.e. agents excercising their powers in appropriate ways put obligations on others.
Sanctions
Sanctions and enforcement policies are a means of dealing with 'undesirable' behaviour, or behaviour that does not accord with the standing rules of the committee. We have already seen some indications of this: for example, declaring a motion as carried when the votes cast and standing rules dictate that it should not have carried; and closing a ballot without permission (to close the ballot).
Sanctions are heavily domain dependent, and the actual form of representation is as complex as that of representing motions. In our formulation of the voting protocol, we associate a 3-figure 'sanction code' (in the same way that 3-figure error codes are used in internet protocols) with each type of 'undesirable behaviour', and record, for each agent, a list of such codes which will be added to as a consequence of actions performed by the agent that are considered transgressions of acceptable behaviour. Note that what these describe are not sanctions per se, as there is no penalty applied: what we have instead are codes which identify violations so that the appropriate sanction (penalty) can be applied.
The following set of axioms illustrate the specification of sanctions for three of the 'undesirable' actions identified above (the others are similar). Note that with the sanction code, the motion related to the sanction is also recorded, and as the code numbers may indicate, this is not an exhaustive specification of all the sanctions.
Note it is the second of these axioms, closing the ballot without permission, which incurs the sanction for 'violating' an agent's right to vote.
Objection
One important point to note about sanctions, is that agents which have powers, and exercise them even without permission, bring about a change of state regardless of whether the action was correct or not. Together with the sanction mechanism, this provides a substantial element of flexibility, which, as indicated earlier, was a desirable aspect of robustness. For example, given a proposal, we can give the chair the power to open a ballot without waiting for a seconder. The sanction (code 105) is duly recorded, but the vote can proceed and the decision taken regardless. Having identified a 'sanctionable action', the appropriate sanction can be applied at a later time.
What is also required, is a general objection action, which retracts the effect of an action that was 'not according to the rules' (of RONR), i.e. it was 'out of order'. This mechanism was used by Artikis et al [5] in their specification of the argumentation protocol, and a similar formulation can be applied here. This is the motivation for introducing the object, sustain, and overrule actions listed in Table 1, although we have to ensure that the specification does not allow one agent to object to another's vote that is 'in order'. However, there are many open issues in the formalisation of objection, and as it does not further conceptual understanding of our primary concern (a treatment of enfranchisement), we leave further investigation of this issue for future work. Other areas of future work are addressed in the next section.
FUTURE WORK
In this section, we present aspects of further and future research, of which the analysis and formalization of the voting protocol is an important component. In the following sections we describe the system for online deliberative assemblies (currently under development), and address three issues which impact this development, namely monitoring, evaluation and transparency.
Online Deliberative Assemblies
We are developing a system for supporting online deliberative assemblies based on a concrete setting. This setting is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Platform for Online Deliberative Assemblies
The physical components of this system include:
• a shared whiteboard and projector: the shared whiteboard is a conventional technology used for allowing two or more people to view and write on a shared drawing surface. This equipment is set up in a fixed physical space, e.g. a meeting or conference room;
• the resource controller: computer running the shared whiteboard server application, also containing a thread which implements the agent/controller that executes commands, grants access, etc. (cf. [3] );
• mobile devices: these are portable devices (e.g. phones, PDAs, laptops, etc.) that are carried into the physical space, connected to the server by some wireles communciations (e.g. Bluetooth), and run client agents (whose role/entitlement could be voters, proposers, seconders etc.);
• remote clients: as above, but situated in remote locations and connected by a fixed infrastructure (i.e. the Internet)
• networking: the system supports formation of ad hoc networks at the physical level (integrating mobile devices) and at the application level (local and remote clients can come and go at will).
The system has been inspired by the ZENO system, an automated system providing advice for human mediators of discussion groups and decision support functions for group decision-making applications [16] . There is much in ZENO, in particular in terms of its formalization of RONR, that can directly benefit this development. One additional element here is the exploitation of ad hoc networks, while another new element is the integration of a number of protocols.
[16] outline a 'main loop' of their system: Figure 2 is an adaptation of their diagram. This diagram also shows that the implementation of this loop can be conducted through three protocols:
• floor control protocol: [3] specifies a floor control protocol which ensures that only a designated user or users can have access to certain objects (shared resources). This protocol is necessary to allow agents to acquire the floor in order to propose motions;
• argumentation protocol: [5] specifies an argumentation protocol which provides a procedure for discussion and dispute resolution. This protocol is necessary to allow agents to debate the motion; the determiner can optionally be used to declare a 'winner' but in any case we expect that following the debate the motion will be put to a vote in any case;
• voting protocol: as formulated here. Note that a vote is technically possible for every issue that requires a decision, but there is an issue of granularity here. While it might make sense, for example, to vote on admission control, it would not make so much sense to take a vote every time someone requested the floor.
Note that the specification of each of these three protocols has the same conceptual and theoretical basis: therefore we expect the voting protocol to interoperate with the argumentation protocol since the same formalism has been used to specify both tasks. However, although this gives a (coarse) architecture for the system and a broad structure to its processes, there are many further issues. We next discuss these as they relate to monitoring, evaluation, and transparency.
Development Issues
Monitors
The primary issue in a system implementation which enacts the protocol is the correct declaration of the result according to the standing rules. Recall the specification included a fluent votes for each motion, whose range was a 2-tuple. One element was incremented each time a vote was cast for, or against, the motion. However, the animation effectively takes an 'external' view of a 'perfect' system: in reality, the data structure for counting votes has to be stored somewhere, furthermore, it has to be accessed correctly, and it must support the correct decision being made (i.e. a guarantee that the chair has declared the result correctly according to the standing rules of the committee).
There are various solutions. One alternative is to provide a software vote counter with an appropriate interface to each agent. The disadvantages though are threefold. Firstly, this means there is a centralised component of the system, which is an undesirable feature of peer-to-peer computing. Secondly, there is a problem of coordination: the chair has to tell the 'vote counter' to close a ballot, while other agents are still casting their votes. This raises a number of avoidable timing issues. Thirdly, there is the problem of registration, i.e., ensuring that each agent empowered to vote is registered with the 'vote counter'. This means knowing which agents are empowered, so the 'vote counter' is effectively operating at the knowledge level of the agents themselves, which suggests it should also be an agent.
If the vote counting software is to be an agent, then there are three alternatives. Firstly, control of the vote counter can be left entirely with the chair. But unless full disclosure of every vote is made to every agent, we cannot guarantee that the chair declares the result correctly. However, if the knowledge of how votes are cast is open to all, this precludes private ballots. Therefore, the solution we are seeking is through the use of monitors, one of the subsets defined on the set of members in section 2, and hitherto unused in the formal specification. The function of a monitor (or monitors) is to receive notice of each vote cast (with a privacy constraint not to reveal who voted which way), and be under an obligation to object if the result declared does not correspond with the record of votes.
Note that the role of monitors goes some way to satisfying the 2004 ACM Statement on E-voting [1] , which was concerned with providing independent checks on the results and mechanisms for conducting recounts in the case of a dispute.
Verification
A particular issue of concern, given our stated concern about producing the correct result, is how to verify that the the formalism works as intended: not only that it contains no logical errors but also that it does indeed achieve the intended result.
For example, system designers may wish to verify properties of the protocol specification in order to determine whether or not this specification meets their requirements. Similarly, agents themselves might wish to prove various properties of the protocol specification in order to decide whether or not they should participate in the system running the protocol. Such properties may include, for instance, the consistency of the protocol specification (no agent is forbidden and obliged to perform the same action at the same time), that in all circumstances there is always an obligation to count a vote, that non-compliance with this obligation always leads to a sanction, and so on. We have been experimenting with the use of various techniques (for example, planning query computation and model checking) to prove properties of a protocol specification expressed in the C + action language [5, 19] . Our specification of norm-governed systems is not dependent on any particular action language or temporal structure. We aim to investigate the feasibility and practicality of the application of some of these techniques to an EC-formalised protocol specification in order to prove properties of such a specification.
Transparency
A third issue, that follows on from evaluation, is transparency, by which we mean the extent to which the agents (electronic or human) are aware of their normative positions and/or are able to compute their normative positions for themselves.
The voting protocol specification can be expressed as a logic program and is therefore directly executable providing a route to prototype implementations or components of a delivered system. In previous work [4] we presented ways of executing an EC action description expressing a protocol specification. The executable specification presented in this paper may similarly inform the agents decision-making at run-time, for example, by allowing the powers, permissions, obligations, and sanctions current at any time to be determined. The issue then is whether reasoning about the normative positions is distributed (so each agent has responsibility for computing its own status) or centralised (i.e. there is a centralised server which computes, maintains and publishes this information on behalf of the agents).
In the case of online deliberative assemblies where we expect some of the agents involved to be humans, it is clear that there is a need to validate the specifications at designtime, but that we also need to compute the normative positions at run-time, and perform this function on behalf of the human agent. After that, we need to find a way of making the normative positions manifest to the user, and one way to do this is to constrain the set of actions available through the interface. In this way we can also regiment the system [10] , and so ensure that the only actions performed are those that are permitted.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
This paper has been concerned with the issue of taking votes in online deliberative assemblies. The main aspect of our concern has not been in ensuring that the process is resistant to manipulation by strategic voting, nor that the process is as flexible as possible, but in ensuring the validity of the outcome. To this end, we identified a procedure for taking votes at meetings based on RONR, and then analysed what it mean to be 'enfranchised' in such a procedure. Our analysis (one of many) was based on the intuition that there appeared to be both an element of right and an element of entitlement that constituted the concept of 'enfranchisement'. We then showed how these elements could be encapsulated in a formal specification of the voting protocol expressed in the Event Calculus. We then went on to consider objections and sanctions and a route to realisation of this protocol in a computer system, and some of the related issues in granularity and representation. In a related paper [14] , we have concentrated on the executable specification of this formalization of the voting protocol for another application, namely virtual organizations. We note, however, that there remain several other aspects to formalise and implement, for example casting votes for the chair, recounts, candidate elections, and so on.
In conclusion, the analysis presented here has demonstrated the importance of normative concepts like powers, rights (entitlements), and obligations in socially-organized interaction. It has shown that the process by which a decision is reached must also preserve the validity of the outcome, i.e. the decision is correctly reached (this is a different matter to reaching the correct decision). In one sense, having a vote should be like having access to an abstract voting machine, which verifies the voter and correctly records the vote.
The challenge ahead consists of correctly realising this in software. This will partly be dependent on whether implementation must consider whether the system consists of purely software components, purely human 'agents' (and the software acts as a decision-support system [16] ), or mixed. In each case, the extent to which the system should be regimented [10] (the agents can only do what they are permitted to do) has to be balanced against the flexibility to perform actions 'out of order'.
However, we conclude by considering again the ACM Statement on E-Voting, and in particular the requirements that votes should be "accurately cast" and provide a "check on the result". We note that these are intrinsic properties of our specification: therefore if our implementation (verifiably) meets the specification then it is satisfying these requirements.
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